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Introduction
A wide variety of normative ethical views have been developed as the 
field of ethics has progressed.1 Proponents of each view disagree with 
one another about the deontic status of acts and about the exact 
 right-making features of acts. Utilitarians, for instance, believe that an 
action is right because it maximizes utility, while Kantians believe an 
action is right because it accords with the categorical imperative. Virtue 
ethics is often understood as a set of normative ethical views that are 
purported rivals to versions of consequentialism, deontology, contrac-
tualism, and other normative ethical views.2 To be sure, not all accounts 
of virtue  ethics are developed to fit this role. Some accounts of virtue 
ethics don’t consider the virtues to be directly tied to right action, but 
nevertheless assign the virtues a non-trivial role with respect to what 
makes an action right.3 Nevertheless, numerous contemporary accounts 
of virtue ethics are  developed to rival existing substantive normative 
ethical views, irrespective of whether such accounts should be 
 categorized in this manner.4 We will henceforth collectively refer to 
1 This work is the product of full and equal collaboration between its authors.
2 See, e.g., Simon (1986: 212), Hursthouse (1991,  1999,  2006), Slote (1996), Zagzebski 
(1996: 135; 2010), Swanton (2003: ch. 11), Strangl (2010), Doviak (2011), and Ciurria (2012).
3 For an approach that paves the way for this strategy, see e.g. Adams (1976), Hurka (2000), 
and Driver (2001). Other work within virtue ethics, such as identifying the correct theory of 
virtue, is not directly concerned with right action, though is nevertheless closely related to it. 
See Bradley (2018).
4 For reasons to doubt that such accounts should be categorized in this manner, see 
Nussbaum (1999). See also Copp and Sobel (2004) and Sobel (2017, ch. 10) on the limits of a 
virtue ethics position that rivals existing normative ethical views.
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virtue ethics positions that purport to rival existing normative ethical 
views as VNETs (for  virtue-theoretic normative ethical theory).
VNETs have been met with skepticism partly because of their sup-
posed problems that are allegedly not shared by versions of consequen-
tialism, deontology, or contractualism. For example, VNETs have been 
criticized on the grounds that they cannot produce action-guiding 
moral prescriptions, that they cannot provide grounds for justified 
moral beliefs, and that they lack codifiability.5 Virtue ethicists have 
responded to these critiques and, as a consequence, have significantly 
advanced accounts of VNETs in the last few decades. The aforemen-
tioned objections to VNETs have usually been leveled, and rebutted, in a 
piecemeal fashion.6 However, we believe that greater attention should be 
spent on the general criteria that must be met in order for VNETs to 
count as complete normative ethical views that rival existing conse-
quentialist, deontological, and contractualist views. So, our goal in this 
chapter is twofold. First, we aim to provide criteria that determine the 
degree to which a traditional normative ethical theory is complete, and 
then investigate virtue ethics on the basis of these criteria. In doing so, 
we argue that, contrary to popular opinion, no existing VNET is a 
 complete normative ethical view that rivals existing consequentialist, 
de onto logic al, and contractualist views. Second, we argue that one of 
the most significant challenges facing virtue ethics consists in offering a 
plausible account of the right-making features of actions, while 
 remaining a distinctively virtue ethical view.
1. The Criteria for Being a Complete Normative 
Ethical Theory
1.1 Motivating the Criteria
At first glance, one might think that a complete normative 
 ethical  theory need only offer necessary and sufficient conditions for 
each  deontic status of an action (e.g. supererogatory, obligatory, 
5 See e.g. Louden (1984), Nussbaum (1999), Copp and Sobel (2004), Svensson and 
Johansson (2018: 502–3).
6 See e.g. Hursthouse (2016).
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permissible, impermissible).7 For instance, consider the following 
de onto logic al view:
 (1) An action is right iff that action accords with moral principle 
P. Suppose P is sufficiently precise such that (1) renders a verdict about 
whether an action is right under any possible circumstances. Is (1) 
thereby a complete normative ethical view? No. At least, (1) is not a 
complete normative ethical view in the sense that may be ascribed to, 
e.g., hedonistic act-utilitarianism, Peter Singer’s two level preference-
based utilitarianism,8 or Allen Wood’s Kantianism.9 Nor does it 
approach completeness in the way that may be ascribed to other incom-
plete normative ethical views, such as Doug Portmore’s commonsense 
consequentialism or Rossian  deontology.10 This is, in part, because such 
views identify the right-making features of actions, while (1) does not. 
To see this, note that (1) is consistent with the following consequential-
ist view that is similarly not a complete normative ethical view:
 (2) An action is right iff that action results in the best consequences. 
The notion of ‘the best consequences’ can be cashed out in such a way 
that an action accords with principle P iff it results in the best conse-
quences. More generally, for any (plausible) set of necessary and suf-
ficient conditions under which an action is right, such  conditions can 
arguably be spelled out in consequentialist terms.11 What’s missing, 
then, in the above accounts is the notion of ‘because.’ In other words, 
a complete normative ethical theory not only identifies the deontic 
status of all possible actions under all possible circumstances, it also 
identifies the features that determine the deontic status of all possible 
actions under all possible circumstances.12 So, assuming P is suffi-
ciently precise, we can turn (1) into a complete normative ethical 
view with the following addition.
7 For instance, Moore (2007: 297–9) gives an account of completeness understood solely in 
terms of identifying right and wrong action.
8 Singer (2011). 9 Wood (2007). 10 Portmore (2011).
11 See Portmore (2009) and Dreier (2011).
12 It’s standard to hold that complete normative ethical theories must both take a stance on 
the deontic status of any possible act under and possible circumstance and identify the right-
making features of actions. See Timmons (2012: 15) and Kagan (1997). This is sometimes 
referred to as the theoretical aim of normative ethics. Many ethicists, however, hold that 
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 (3) An action is right iff (and because) that action accords with 
moral principle P. To be sure, distinct complete normative ethical 
views can yield identical prescriptions about the deontic status of any 
possible act under any possible circumstance, even when they 
 disagree about the features that determine their deontic status. This is 
one reason why the identification of right-making features is a cru-
cial elem ent of any complete normative ethical view. To illustrate this 
point further, consider the following two views.
DIVINE COMMAND THEORY (DCT) An action is obligatory iff 
(and because) God commands it. An action is impermissible iff (and 
because) God forbids it. An action is permissible, but not obligatory, iff 
(and because) God neither commands it nor forbids it.13
HEDONISTIC ACT UTILITARIANISM (HAU) An action is obliga-
tory iff (and because) it maximizes hedonic utility. An action is imper-
missible iff (and because) it does not maximize hedonic utility. An 
action is permissible, but not obligatory, iff (and because) it’s a mem-
ber of a set of actions, and there is at least one additional set of actions, 
such that these two sets result in identical maximal amounts of 
hedonic utility.
Now suppose that God exists and commands agents to always perform 
actions that maximizes net hedonic utility and forbids performing 
actions that bring about less net hedonic utility than some available act-
alternative. On that supposition, DCT and HAU yield identical prescrip-
tions about the deontic status of any action under any possible 
circumstance.14 Nevertheless, DCT and HAU are inconsistent with each 
complete normative ethical views also must satisfy the so-called practical aim of providing a 
decision procedure for agents to successfully reason about what to do. See, for instance, 
Svensson and Johansson (2018: 491) and Forcehimes and Semrau (2019). At least for the pur-
poses of this chapter, we’re understanding complete normative ethical views to consist of the 
theoretical aim, and understand the practical aim as distinct from the theory itself. But nothing 
im port ant, for the purposes of our argument, hangs on this assumption.
13 Quinn (1978), Alston (1990), Adams (1999).
14 This is assuming, as some theists do, that God necessarily exists and that God’s com-
mands are invariant across possible worlds.
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other because they disagree about the right-making features of actions, 
and so they are rivals.
1.2 The Criteria for Completeness
We have thus arrived at the following conclusion: the degree to which a 
normative ethical theory T is complete is, at least in part, dependent 
upon the degree to which T satisfies the following two conditions:
(A) T takes a stance15 on the deontic status of everything T takes to 
have deontic status(es) under any possible circumstance, and does 
so by providing maximally precise and informative necessary and 
sufficient conditions for whichever deontic status(es) proponents 
of T believe such things (e.g. acts, beliefs, intentions, dispositions, 
desires) possess. T holds that everything else has no deontic status.
(B)   T identifies the maximal set of fundamental right-making fea-
tures for whatever T takes to have deontic statuses.
In light of these criteria, some readers may worry that we’re talking past 
proponents of VNETs, as such views may be thought to assume moral 
particularism and thus be necessarily uncodifiable. We address this 
worry in Section 2.
To reiterate, in this chapter we are targeting the set of normative 
 eth ic al views with the traditional aim of identifying the criteria of a right 
action. Those views are complete to the extent that they satisfy 
 conditions (A) and (B).16 Being complete, and so fully satisfying condi-
tions (A) and (B), is a theoretical asset since complete normative ethical 
the or ies will have explanatory power that incomplete normative ethical 
theories lack. While being incomplete is a strike against a normative 
15 Taking a stance includes assigning a deontic category to a specific action, as well as the 
claim that an action has an indeterminate deontic status, or any related notion. If T holds that 
there are evaluative rankings (e.g. better/worse) over and above deontic statutes, then they 
must also take a stance on everything T takes to have an evaluating ranking.
16 These criteria don’t necessarily apply to work done in normative ethics with different 
aims, such as identifying a correct decision procedure, accounting for the nature of moral 
responsibility, moral debt, and so on.
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ethical theory, it’s also worth noting that such views may have other 
theoretical assets and may even be, all things considered, superior to 
existing complete theories.
1.3 Metaphysical versus Epistemic Explanations
Before we apply these criteria to VNETs, we need to clarify our  conception 
of a right-making feature of an action. As illustrated above, terms such as 
‘because’ are often used to identify the right-making  features of actions. 
Such terms, however, can also be used to denote substantially different 
explanatory ‘because’ locutions, and this linguistic ambiguity can obfus-
cate the purported meaning of various formulations of normative ethical 
views. A particularly egregious obfuscation arises when a metaphysical 
grounding relation is mistaken for an epistemic one. On our view, an 
account of rightness that incorporates the term ‘because’ (or similar 
explanatory terms) satisfies (B) only if that term is understood in a meta-
physical sense rather than an epistemological one. It can, at times, be dif-
ficult to discern which locutions are being invoked by certain accounts of 
VNET. For instance, Linda Zagzebski’s exemplarist virtue theory contains 
the following definition of a right action (2010: 54–5):
A right act (an act that a person would have most moral reason to do) 
in some set of circumstances C is what the admirable person would 
take to be most favored by the balance of reasons in circumstances C.
Zagzebski employs the phrase “the admirable person” in order to, as 
Zagzebski (2010: 51) puts it, “anchor” the concept of rightness (and 
other basic moral concepts) by direct reference to particular exemplary 
persons of moral goodness who, like water and gold, function as natural 
kind terms. Zagzebski, however, seems to be picking out an epistemic, 
as opposed to metaphysical, grounding relation in her work.17 As we 
17 This is what a general reading of her work suggests and it seems to follow from the fact 
that she’s interested in concepts rather than properties. Thanks to an anonymous referee for 
raising this point.
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will argue in the next section, epistemic explanations won’t satisfy con-
dition (B) and so won’t make any headway to making VNETs competi-
tors to other normative ethical theories.
1.4 Epistemic Explanations Do Not  
Satisfy Condition (B)
The problem is that the sort of foundation being invoked in Zagzebski’s 
account is, to all appearances, epistemic. This is illustrated when she 
claims that we identify and imitate moral exemplars through the 
 emotion of admiration which “can be used to give us both a way of 
understanding significant moral concepts and a way of making ourselves 
and our lives conform to the admirable” [italics added] (2010: 54). If 
anchoring basic concepts of morality in a particular virtuous person is 
understood epistemically, then this theory (while potentially plausible 
in its own right) does not satisfy condition (B) and so is not complete in 
the sense at issue in this chapter.
There is, of course, a perfectly natural use of terms such as ‘because’ 
that aims to offer epistemic reasons for believing that some specific 
action in certain circumstances is morally right. For instance, in 
response to the question, “Why do you think that helping that elderly per-
son cross the street is the right thing to do?,” it’s perfectly natural to invoke 
epistemic reasons for believing that the action in question is morally 
right. One may respond “Because Sharon is an exemplary person and she 
often helps elderly people cross the street.” Such responses that appeal to 
epistemic reasons can explain why one may justifiably believe that some 
act token has a particular deontic status, but it does not explain why  the 
act token has that status. Complete normative ethical views must be able 
to answer the latter question and not merely the former.18 Moreover, 
since other traditional normative ethical views invoke a metaphysical 
explanatory relation, it’s not clear that they’re strictly inconsistent with 
18 In his (2011: 198), Glen Pettigrove briefly alludes to this sort of distinction when he 
writes that the “criterion used for picking out good actions may involve an identification of the 
good-making feature of the action. But it need not.”
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VNETs cashed out in terms of the epistemic grounding relation, such as 
Zagzebski’s view.19
A metaphysical interpretation of Zagzebski’s moral exemplarist the-
ory that aims to satisfy condition (B) is, we think, highly implausible. 
If helping the elderly person cross the street is ultimately made right 
by the fact that Sharon, a particular moral exemplar, has performed 
this action as a result to taking this action to be most favored by the 
balance of  reasons, then there is no deeper explanation as to why per-
forming this action is right; the reasons themselves don’t explain the 
deontic status of an action. As we argue in the next section, however, the 
right-making features of an action cannot plausibly be the fact that that 
action is what a particular moral exemplar would perform, even though 
moral  exemplars surely can—through the role of admiration—provide 
 epistemic reasons for believing that some action is right.
1.5 Varying Degrees of (Metaphysical)  
Explanatory Levels
In addition to avoiding an obfuscation between epistemic and meta-
physical explanations for an action’s deontic status, we must recognize 
that explanatory terms like “because” can be accurately applied at 
 various levels of explanatory priority. For instance, consider a version of 
Portmore’s (2011) commonsense consequentialism that accepts a 
Rossian plurality of good-making features. On such a theory, an answer 
to the question, “Why is donating to charity right?” may invoke multiple 
correct uses of “because” that are not all equally fundamental, even 
though all such uses are metaphysical rather than epistemic. To illus-
trate, consider the following two answers to this question:
“Because donating to charity is what I have, all-things-considered, most 
reason to do.”
“Because donating to charity maximizes utility and promotes justice.”
19 Others have made a similar claim by briefly suggesting that some understandings of 
virtue ethics are consistent with other normative ethical views. See, for instance, Svensson 
(2010: 258) and Svensson and Johansson (2018: 500).
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The first answer is less fundamental than the second one insofar as the 
rightness of the action is explained at least partly in terms of reasons for 
action, and these reasons are in turn explained at least in part by a plur-
al ity of good-making features (maximizing utility, promoting justice, 
etc.) that provide pro tanto reasons for action.
In light of these multiple explanatory levels that account for a right 
action, a complete normative ethical theory that fully satisfies condi-
tion (B) must identify the number of explanatory levels invoked and, 
crucially, identify the most fundamental explanatory level(s). Moreover, 
in order to determine whether two theories are genuine rivals with 
respect to identifying the right-making features of an action, we must 
identify the number of layers of explanation to which a theory is com-
mitted and see whether the two theories in question are incompatible 
at any layer of explanation, with special attention paid to the most 
 fundamental (i.e. the “rock bottom”) explanation of an action’s deontic 
status.
1.6 A Brief Recap
To recap, in this section we have defended the claim that a normative 
ethical view with the traditional aim of identifying the criteria of the 
right is complete to the extent it satisfies conditions (A) and (B). 
Additionally, we noted that it’s unclear whether a theory purports to 
 satisfy condition (B) when it does not specify whether it’s offering a 
metaphysical or epistemological account of right action and when it 
does not specify the level of fundamentality in the account of right-
making features. In order to fully satisfy (B), the theory must offer a 
metaphysical account of right action that identifies the most fundamen-
tal right-making features of actions.
In the next section, we argue that existing VNETs do not satisfy (A) to 
a high degree, so much so that they are at least extensionally consistent 
with a wide range of normative ethical views. As such, unless they 
 identify different right-making features than their supposed alterna-
tives, they are not competitors to such views. Then, in the final section, 
we assess VNETs’ prospects of satisfying (B). In doing so, we argue that 
every VNET faces a familiar, yet significant, challenge. They seem 
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un able to offer a plausible account of the right-making features of 
actions, while remaining a distinctively virtue ethical view. We pose a 
version of this challenge that, we believe, has not been adequately dealt 
with in the current virtue ethics literature.
2. VNETs’ Prospects of Satisfying (A)
In this section, we proceed by highlighting a few particularly difficult 
moral questions that can be answered by VNETs’ normative ethical 
rivals, and explain why existing VNETs, by contrast, can do very little to 
answer such questions. We also consider (what we take to be) some of 
the best accounts of VNET on offer and argue that more work needs to 
be done in order for them to fully satisfy condition (A).
The careful reader will notice that our argument seemingly general-
izes to other pluralistic accounts of well-being, perhaps most notably 
Rossian deontology. While our focus in this chapter is specifically on 
VNETs, it’s worth noting that we embrace this conclusion. Different 
normative ethical theories will approach completeness to varying 
degrees, and theories such as Rossian deontology likely fare about as 
well as existing VNETs.20 To be clear, Rossian deontology (and any 
incomplete normative ethical theory) can be precisified to the point of 
completeness, and such theories may even be true. As we note in this 
section, such theories may even have other theoretical virtues that 
 provide us with most reason, all things considered, to accept them in 
spite of their incompleteness. Nevertheless, we think completeness is 
one important theoretical virtue, and it’s one worth thinking about with 
respect to all normative ethical theories, and not simply VNETs.
20 Other accounts of completeness in the literature, such as Moore (2007), entail that 
Rossian deontology is incomplete and no account on offer seems to entail that it is complete. 
Incompleteness, of course, doesn’t apply to all pluralistic normative ethical theories and it cer-
tainly isn’t exclusive to pluralistic accounts. In our view, typical formulations of many monistic 
and pluralistic normative ethical views are incomplete for a variety of reasons, including the 
fact that they don’t take a stand on the actualism/possibilism debate in ethics. See Timmerman 
and Cohen (2019).
The Limits of Virtue Ethics 265
2.1 The Primary Obstacle to Satisfying (A)
Consider any set of exceedingly difficult moral questions. Are we 
 obligated to give the welfare of one’s intimates extra weight in our moral 
deliberation? To what extent are people in affluent nations obligated to 
sacrifice their welfare to aid those living in extreme poverty? Under 
what conditions, if any, is it permissible to get a late term abortion?
A complete normative ethical theory that fully satisfies (A) provides 
answers to these types of questions. Consider the last one. According to 
Singer’s (old) two level preference-based utilitarianism, it’s permissible 
for an agent to get a late term abortion at time t iff aborting at t  maximizes 
preference satisfaction. Alternatively, according to one version of 
Kantianism, it’s permissible for an agent to get a late term abortion at t 
iff the agent does so by acting on a universalizable maxim. To be clear, 
individuals will still encounter a good deal of normative uncertainty on 
both of these views. However, so long as one knows all of the relevant 
non-normative facts, one could in principle identify the deontic status of 
any possible act in any circumstance given either Singer’s utilitarianism 
or the above version of Kantianism. The same is true of any complete 
normative ethical theory that fully satisfies (A).
Existing VNETs are, in this respect, unlike their rivals because they 
have not been developed in enough detail to provide (even in principle) 
answers to such difficult-to-navigate moral questions, even if all of the 
relevant non-normative facts are known. Consider what is required of a 
VNET to answer questions about late term abortions. Imagine a woman, 
Sherrill, who is in her third trimester with a fetus who will, if brought to 
term, develop a life-threatening illness. This will mean that the child will 
require around-the-clock care which will result in hundreds of 
 thousands of dollars in medical bills. This will bankrupt the family, 
causing them to live below the poverty line for the remainder of their 
lives.21 Carrying the child to term will display certain virtues: perhaps 
selflessness, generosity, bravery, and respect for life. Aborting the child 
will also display certain virtues: perhaps compassion, prudence, and a 
21 Hursthouse alludes to a case of this kind in her (1991: 241).
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kind of fortitude with respect to providing adequate care for one’s 
children.22
In order for a VNET to answer the question of whether it’s per mis-
sible for Sherrill in the above scenario to get a late term abortion at t, it 
must identify each of the virtues that would be displayed by each of the 
actions available to her. Since these actions would display different 
 virtues to different degrees, the VNET in question must provide some 
way to rank the virtues. That is, in order to answer the question of 
whether it’s permissible for Sherrill to go through with the late term 
abortion, the VNET must say how the conflicting virtues weigh against 
one another in order to determine the deontic status of going through 
with the abortion and the deontic status of not doing so.23 To fully 
 satisfy  condition (A), then, a VNET must complete this task for every  
possible difficult-to-navigate moral case. No VNET we are aware of pro-
vides a method for identifying all of the virtues that may be displayed 
for any possible action or provides a method for ranking the evaluative 
“weight” of these virtues against one another in order to determine 
which action available to an agent is the most virtuous. Accounts of 
VNET that fail to do this don’t fully satisfy condition (A) and, to that 
extent, are therefore incomplete.
2.2 Classic Aristotelianism to the Rescue?
Our stipulations in the abortion case reveal our commitment to a 
 pos ition shared by many, but not all, virtue ethicists, viz. that an action 
may be aretaically mixed: one action available to an agent may express 
one virtue while another, incompatible action available to the agent may 
display a different virtue (Swanton 2003, 2015; Smith 2018). Of course, 
22 Hursthouse invokes the virtue of “appropriate modesty or humility” to these types of 
cases in her (1991: 244).
23 Again, for the purposes of this chapter, we include indeterminate deontic statuses as 
types of deontic statuses. Still, unless we suppose that nearly all  actions have an indeterminate 
deontic status or that all actions with indeterminate deontic statuses are equally choice worthy, 
the virtue ethicist must explain how certain virtues that are displayed by a right action “out-
weigh” the virtues that are displayed by an alternative wrong action.
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there is logical space for a particular VNET which holds that, neces-
sarily, agents always have just one available act alternative that would 
involve a display of virtue of any kind. To our knowledge no virtue ethi-
cist has defended such an implausible view.
One might suspect, however, that a classical Aristotelian virtue theory 
that affirms the unity of the virtues can provide a methodological tool 
for identifying the deontic status of an action in difficult, morally 
 complex scenarios.24 Some classical virtue theorists pick out four 
 cardinal virtues—courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom—from 
which all other virtues may be derived (cf. Oderberg 1999). The history 
of clas sic al virtue ethics also suggests that some virtues are more valuable 
than other virtues to the extent that the more valuable virtues express 
the excellences of higher aspects of human nature (Irwin 2007). While 
this gets the classical VNET in question a few steps closer to satisfying 
(A), it does not get them very far. In order to fully satisfy condition (A), 
such virtue theorists would have to provide a complete list of both the 
 cardinal and non-cardinal virtue(s), a list of which cardinal virtue(s) 
each non-cardinal virtue is derived from, and an account of how each 
possible display of each (cardinal or non-cardinal) virtue ought to be 
ranked against each possible display of every other (cardinal or non-
cardinal) virtue. For example, does an act that displays moderate gener-
osity outrank one that displays moderate temperance? What about a 
display of mild generosity versus a non-trivially smaller display of 
temperance?
Now, one might think that this objection misses the point because the 
virtue ethicist who accepts the unity of the virtues supposedly obviates 
24 Hirji (2019) argues that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics can be distinguished from other 
prominent normative ethical views by the fact that it analyzes “the goodness of actions in terms 
of the goodness of character” and because it analyzes “virtue of character in terms of human 
flourishing” (p. 5). The first commitment is supposed to make neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics a 
competitor to other normative ethical views. However, the first commitment is consistent with 
various forms of consequentialism and deontology, so this condition (in itself) will not make 
neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics a competitor to other types of normative ethical views. The sec-
ond commitment may be unique to typical accounts of virtue ethics, but it could be consist-
ently adopted by proponents of any (or almost any) normative ethical view, and so it too is 
insufficient to make neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics a competitor to other types of normative 
ethical views.
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the need to provide such rankings. You can’t weigh the manifestation of 
one virtue against itself, can you? In one sense, perhaps you cannot. But 
in another, more accurate, sense you can. Such virtue ethicists can rank 
particular displays of a virtue entailed by performing one action against 
displays of that same virtue entailed by performing an alternative action 
in the same context, and that is exactly what a proponent of the unity of 
virtues would need to do in order for their view to fully satisfy (A). To 
our knowledge, no such classical VNET has come close (or even tried) 
to fully answer such questions.
2.3 Swanton’s Account
Nevertheless, recent developments in virtue ethics offer a more promis-
ing method for satisfying (A). Consider Christine Swanton’s (2003: 228) 
account of a right action:
 (1)  An action is virtuous in respect V (e.g. benevolent, generous) if 
and only if it hits the target of (realizes the end of) virtue V (e.g. 
benevolence, generosity).
 (2) An action is right if and only if it’s overall virtuous.
An action that hits the target of a certain virtue is one that accomplishes 
the goal behind that virtue. For example, an action hits the target of just-
ice insofar as that action promotes the aim of justice, such as providing 
someone with a good that they deserve. Swanton understands an act 
that is overall virtuous to be one that is “the, or a, best action possible in 
the circumstances” (2003: 239–40).
This is a promising route to providing a full-fledged VNET that fully 
satisfies (A). But it still needs to identify all of the (cardinal and non-
cardinal) virtues, as well as provide a ranking of these virtues in order to 
identify which action counts as overall virtuous. Without meeting these 
requirements, we simply have no way to determine, even in principle, 
the deontic status of actions in difficult-to-navigate moral cases, even 
when we know all of the relevant non-normative facts.
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2.4 The Shift to Moral Particularism
More recently, Swanton (2015) and Nicholas Ryan Smith (2017) have 
developed versions of VNET that adopt Jonathan Dancy’s (2004) moral 
particularism, which denies an assumption that VNETs’ rivals share, viz. 
that all right actions are made right by the same set of fundamental 
right-making features (whatever those features happen to be). The shift 
to moral particularism may be viewed as a way of side-stepping the need 
to fully satisfy criteria (A). Any version of VNET that adopts moral 
 particularism will not, by definition, yield a verdict about the deontic 
status of all possible actions, even if every possible action does in fact 
have a deontic status. More precisely, such particularlist versions of 
VNET could, in principle, yield a verdict about the deontic status of all 
possible actions, but could not do so in a way that is both finitely statable 
and action-guiding. Does this get VNET off the hook with respect to 
satisfying (A)? We don’t think so.
First, even if all VNETs embrace moral particularism, moral particu-
larism still fails to satisfy condition (A). Of course, if moral particularism 
is true, it would be impossible for humans to both identify the correct 
moral theory and fully satisfy (A). Still, it would not be satisfied. Second, 
and perhaps more importantly, we don’t believe that embracing moral 
particularism justifies the degree to which existing VNETs  currently fail 
to satisfy (A). We have been arguing that in order to fully  satisfy (A), a 
VNET must provide a method for ranking the evaluative “weight” of the 
virtues, specifically in order to address cases in which all of the actions 
available to an agent are aretaically mixed, and thus all actions available 
to an agent would display some virtue or other. Similarly, a moral par-
ticularist VNET that intends to even partly satisfy (A) still needs a 
method—albeit an incomplete one—for ranking the virtues in such a 
manner that this VNET renders a verdict about the deontic status of at 
least some possible actions. To illustrate this point, consider a case in 
which Bill can donate either to charity X or charity Y, each of which 
serve the exact same goal. Furthermore, Bill knows that charity X is the 
significantly more effective one. Assuming that donating to charity Y 
would still do some good, the act of donating to charity Y is aretaically 
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mixed insofar as there is at least some reason for doing so, even if there 
is more reason to donate to charity X. Now, we can all agree that donat-
ing to charity X is the right action. But the central question is how a 
normative ethical theory arrives at this commonsensical verdict 
(Louden 1984: 232–3).
Utilitarianism, for instance, identifies the action of donating to  charity 
X as the right one since this action maximizes utility. If a moral particu-
larist VNET is also in the business of yielding such a verdict, it would 
seem that it needs to tell us which virtues would be displayed by per-
forming each action, as well as why the virtues that would be displayed 
by donating to charity X would outweigh, in some sense, the virtues that 
would be displayed by donating to charity Y. Obviously, this superficial 
case would need to be described in detail—much more detail—in order 
for us to even begin to say which virtues would be displayed by each 
action. One of the points virtue ethicists are quick to bring up is that 
assessing an action’s deontic status requires knowledge of the messy, com-
plex details that are involved in real world moral scenarios. But the point 
still stands that, once these details have been filled in, we need to see how 
a moral particularist VNET arrives at identifying the deontic status of an 
action in not-so-difficult moral scenarios, specifically by telling us which 
 virtues typically happen to outrank or outweigh other virtues, at least if 
the moral particularist VNET intends to generate at least some deontic 
verdicts distinct from versions of consequentialism and its cohorts.
2.5 Virtue Ethics without Deontic Statuses
A VNET proponent could retreat to a more extreme position by denying 
that any action has a deontic status, even though some acts are virtuous 
while others are not (cf. Hacker-Wright  2010).25 This may suffice to 
make the normative ethical view complete, but such a commitment does 
not render one’s view a distinctively virtue ethical position since there 
25 These views should not to be confused with accounts of virtue ethics that seemingly 
acknowledge that acts have deontic statuses, but nevertheless hold that we should eliminate 
discussion of them from our moral discourse. See, for instance, Kraut (2006).
The Limits of Virtue Ethics 271
are rivals to virtue ethics that similarly deny that actions have a deontic 
status, such as scalar consequentialism (Norcross 2006; Sinhababu 2018). 
In order for a VNET to rid itself of deontic concepts while simultaneously 
counting as a genuine rival to, e.g., scalar consequentialism, such a 
 theory must not reduce the notion of a virtuous action to the concepts 
employed by scalar consequentialists or other possible consequentialist, 
deontological, or contractualist views. Were a VNET to be worked out in 
this way it would in fact be a distinctively normative ethical view. In the 
next section, however, we are going to argue that VNETs’ prospects of 
satisfying (B) are not promising, and so it’s unlikely that there could be a 
plausible VNET that rivals other normative ethical views.
To conclude our discussion of (A), we think that existing VNETs do 
not satisfy criterion (A) to a significant degree26 insofar as they still need 
to show us how their respective theory identifies the deontic status of 
actions in moral scenarios by telling us which virtues are displayed by 
the actions available to an agent, and which virtues outweigh other ones 
in such a manner that one of the actions available to the agent is the 
most virtuous or overall virtuous one. In the next section, we turn to 
VNETs’ ability to satisfy criterion (B), which concerns the fundamental 
right-making features of an action.
3. VNETs’ Prospects of Satisfying (B)
3.1 A Dilemma for VNETs
Some VNET proponents have attempted to provide necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for right actions. Consider, for instance, Rosalind 
Hursthouse’s proposal (1991: 225):
(HP) An act is right iff it’s what a virtuous agent would do in the 
circumstances.27
26 The sole exception is a VNET which holds that there are no deontic statuses. Though, 
they would need to be developed in more detail to be a distinctively virtue ethical position.
27 See also Hursthouse’s (1996) revision of her account of a right action (1991: 225). See also 
Oakley (1996), Swanton (2001: 34), and Svensson and Johansson (2018: §3).
272 Travis Timmerman and Yishai Cohen
First, as an aside, notice that (HP) does not satisfy condition (A) because 
it does not include an account of how virtuous agents would act in every 
possible circumstance. Knowing HP, even with Hursthouse’s signifi-
cantly more detailed supplements, and all of the relevant non-moral 
facts will still be insufficient to generate a deontic verdict for every pos-
sible act in every possible circumstance. So, unless we have a principled 
means for determining how a virtuous agent would behave under every 
circumstance, the necessary and sufficient conditions that HP offers are 
neither maximally precise nor particularly informative.
Second, as we have seen, merely identifying necessary and sufficient 
conditions does not suffice for the purposes of identifying the right-making 
features of an action. As an initial step towards fully satisfying criterion 
(B), a VNET should invoke “because” in the above biconditional, which 
is how Smith’s formulation of a VNET is construed: “an action is right if, 
only if, and because it is virtuous” (2017: 241). Now, in light of our dis-
cussion of multiple explanatory layers of a right action, the absolutely 
critical question is whether there are features that make an action 
 virtuous, and whether virtue-theoretic concepts are in dis pens able for 
describing those features. For example, if an action is virtuous because it 
maximizes utility, then such a theory will clearly not count as a genuine 
rival to utilitarianism. We present this concern in more detail in the 
form of a dilemma:
 (i) The fundamental right-making feature(s) of an action is not that that 
action is what a virtuous agent would do, what a virtuous agent would 
be motivated or disposed to do, or that that action is ‘overall virtuous,’ 
whereby the notion of an overall virtuous action is either not ana-
lyzed further or is analyzed specifically in virtue-theoretic terms.
Or,
 (ii) The fundamental right-making feature(s) of an action is that that 
action is what a virtuous agent would do, what a virtuous agent would 
be motivated or disposed to do, or that that action is ‘overall virtuous,’ 
whereby the notion of an overall virtuous action is either not ana-
lyzed further or is analyzed specifically in virtue-theoretic terms.28
28 Svensson considers the merits of a eudemonistic account of virtue ethics that accepts this 
horn in his (2011), but ultimately rejects such a view.
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If the VNET proponent accepts (i), then the view in question is not a 
distinctively virtue ethical position. To see why, imagine an exception-
ally simple theory that identifies “acting honestly” as the sole right-making 
feature (and so acting honestly is the sole virtue).29 Call this view 
VNETH. Given VNETH, in order to know how one ought to act, an agent 
only needs to know that acting in a manner in which one knowingly 
does not deceive others is the sole right-making feature.30 Consequently, 
φ-ing is permissible iff (and because) φ–ing is an action in which one 
does not knowingly communicate a falsehood to others. No mention of 
virtues or virtuous agents is needed. Now, one might try to make VNETH 
a distinctively virtue ethical position by asserting that a virtuous agent 
would always act honestly. One could even provide necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for right actions in terms of virtuous agents’ actions in 
the following manner:
(HONESTY) An action is right iff it’s what a virtuous agent would do in 
the circumstances and, in all circumstances, virtuous agents act in such a 
manner that they don’t knowingly communicate a falsehood to others.
The problem with HONESTY, as we see it, is that no virtue-theoretic 
concepts are indispensable to this theory. To see this, notice that a 
 utilitarian can similarly provide necessary and sufficient conditions for 
right actions in terms of virtuous agents’ actions:
(UTILITY) An action is right iff it’s what a virtuous agent would do in 
the circumstances and, in all circumstances, virtuous agents act in such 
a manner that they maximize utility.
No virtue-theoretic concepts are indispensable to UTILITY since utili-
tarianism can be described in a way that makes no explicit appeal to 
what virtuous agents would do, just as HONESTY can be described in a 
manner that does not invoke the notion of a virtuous agent.31 In both 
29 To simplify, let’s assume that for any set of available act-alternatives, “acting honestly” 
clearly picks out one action or one set of actions.
30 On this view, honesty may be understood as a virtue in the “thin” sense of virtue instead 
of the “thick” sense, although our argument does not hinge on this detail.
31 In his (2012: ch. 2), Dan Russell touches on this problem. Building on Gary Watson’s 
work, Russell concedes that virtue ethics should allow that the rightness of an action is 
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cases, we are identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions of a 
right action, and then simply tacking on the claim that that is precisely 
what a virtuous agent would do in the relevant circumstances.
3.2 Swanton’s Account Falls on  
the First Horn
To illustrate this point with an example, Swanton (2015: 42) seems to 
accept (i) when she writes that “What makes actions right . . . is not that 
they would be chosen by virtuous agents, but that the actions themselves 
are favoured by v-reasons.” Swanton’s conception of a v-reason is con-
strued in terms of her (2003) ‘target centered’ account of virtue ethics. 
Recall that on this view, an action that hits the target of a certain virtue 
is one that accomplishes the goal behind that virtue. So, if kindness is a 
virtue, then the target of kindness may be, e.g., preventing someone 
from experiencing pain. If this is correct, then the fundamental right-
making feature of an act that displays kindness need not appeal to a 
virtue-theoretic concept at all, notwithstanding the fact that these reasons 
are dubbed ‘v-reasons.’ To see this, consider the following increasingly 
more fundamental levels of explanation of a right action:
 • Some action, φ, is right because it’s overall virtuous
 • φ is overall virtuous because it’s favored by v-reasons.
 • φ is favored by v-reasons because φ “hits” the target of the virtue 
kindness.
 • φ “hits” the target of the virtue kindness because φ prevents pain.
contingent upon the goodness/badness of outcomes. But he argues that distinctively virtue 
 ethical positions can hold that bad outcomes prevent actions from being right, while right 
actions will necessarily invoke the concept of a virtue. Importantly, the virtues in question are 
understood as “prior” to right action in the sense that virtues can be understood apart from 
right action, but not vice versa. These conditions are perfectly coherent and strike us as 
 plausible. The problem, however, is that other normative ethical views (e.g. commonsense 
 consequentialism) can also incorporate these conditions into their view. Nothing prevents a 
normative ethical view from understanding virtues apart from the deontic status of acts, as 
virtues don’t need to be defined in such terms, even if they’re logically related to them. Thus, 
these conditions will not suffice to make a view a distinctively virtue ethical one.
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It seems, then, that the fundamental level of explanation of φ’s deontic 
status of being right appeals to a factor that dispenses of virtue-theoretic 
concepts. For this reason, our interpretation of Swanton’s account 
 situates her view on the first horn of our dilemma. If, however, Swanton 
were to insist that the explanatory component of her account bottoms 
out at the third bullet, then her view would fall on the second horn of 
our dilemma. It’s to this horn that we now turn.
3.3 The Second Horn
A VNET that accepts the second horn of the dilemma has to identify the 
fundamental, rock-bottom features of an action that make it right, and 
those features must employ virtue-theoretic concepts.32 There appear to be 
two possible moves for accomplishing this task.
According to the first move, the fundamental right-making features 
of an action are that it possesses the (extrinsic) property of being the 
action that a virtuous agent would perform. This does not appear to be 
plausible insofar as we are searching for the fundamental right-making 
features of an action. To see this, consider a virtuous agent who comes 
across a child drowning in a shallow pond. That agent presumably has a 
reason to save the drowning child because doing so would save the 
child’s life, which is good for the child and from the perspective of the 
universe. But the VNET proponent who adopts the first move cannot 
say this. Instead, she must say either that the virtuous agent who is obli-
gated to save the drowning child nevertheless has no reason to save the 
drowning child, or that their only reason for saving the drowning child 
is that this is what they would do if they were in the very circumstances 
in which they find themselves. One would have thought, however, that 
the correct normative ethical theory would entail that virtuous agents 
would save the child’s life because doing so is what they have most rea-
son to do (or is right or good). One would not have thought that saving 
32 We take Julia Annas to defend this general line of thought in her (2011: ch. 3). Annas 
denies the need for virtue ethics to give an account of right-making actions independent of the 
virtues. She grants that there are right actions in a thin sense but denies that there is something 
substantive and informative that unifies all right actions (p. 50).
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the child’s life is what virtuous agents have most reason to do (or is right 
or good) simply because a virtuous agent would save the child in the 
situation in question.33
The second move for proposing that the fundamental right-making 
features of an action cannot dispense with virtue-theoretic concepts says 
that the fundamental right-making feature of an action is one that is 
overall virtuous. Now, in order for this move to avoid collapsing back 
into the first horn of our dilemma, the notion of an overall virtuous 
action cannot ultimately be explained in terms of non-virtue-theoretic 
concepts. To illustrate, recall our discussion of the multiple explanatory 
levels concerning Swanton’s account of a right action:
 • Some action, φ, is right because it’s overall virtuous
 • φ is overall virtuous because it’s favored by v-reasons.
 • φ is favored by v-reasons because φ “hits” the target of the virtue 
kindness.
 • φ “hits” the target of the virtue kindness because φ prevents pain.
Unlike Swanton’s view, it seems that this move must deny that an overall 
virtuous action can be ultimately defined in terms of the target of a 
 virtue, such as an action’s preventing pain, at least if this move wishes to 
stay on the second horn of our dilemma. J. L. A. Garcia makes this sort 
of move in his (1990), arguing that some virtues are prior to deontic 
verdicts (while some virtues are defined in terms of dispositions to do 
the right thing). Garcia denies that all virtues can be defined in terms of 
deontic verdicts because they’re complex character traits that consist of 
a “mental response,” which may or may not be expressed in action. 
Perhaps one is disposed to act kindly, for instance, even if they don’t get 
the chance to act in that way. Likewise, a virtuous agent may display the 
virtue of kindness while performing an act, while a vicious agent may 
perform the same act for different reasons, not displaying the virtue of 
kindness. So, such accounts of virtue ethics take the praiseworthy/
33 Svensson makes this point in his (2011: 328) and in Svensson and Johansson (2018: 499). 
Similar concerns are raised in Das (2003), Copp and Sobel (2004: 547) and (2017), Driver 
(2006: 118), and Tännsjö (2001: 170, 173).
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blameworthy features of actions to play a role in determining the de ontic 
verdicts of actions, which other normative ethical views (e.g. typical 
forms of consequentialism) do not.
Is this enough to create a distinctive account of virtue ethics and 
avoid being impaled on the second horn of the dilemma? We don’t think 
so. First, while other normative ethical views tend not to let the 
 praiseworthy/blameworthy features of actions figure in the deontic 
 verdicts, nothing prevents them from doing so. For instance, one could 
create a number of different forms of consequentialism, where the 
agents’ mo tiv ations for acting factor into the goodness/badness of the 
consequences. Second, while it’s certainly possible that virtues are 
explanatorily prior to deontic verdicts, we find that implausible for 
 reasons already given. Virtues may function in the way Garcia suggests, 
but that does not provide reason to believe that virtues are prior to 
deontic verdicts. In fact, virtues seem to get their normative force from 
the fact that acting on them results in some (intrinsic) good or 
 preventing some (intrinsic) bad. If virtues are not grounded in such 
goods (or the prevention of such bads), then it’s unclear why being vir-
tuous matters morally at all.
So why exactly is it supposed to be problematic for VNETs to deny 
that an overall virtuous action can be ultimately defined in terms of the 
target of a virtue? Isn’t it plausible to think that the exemplification of 
certain virtues outranks, in some sense, the exemplification of other 
 virtues? The answer is ‘yes’ in one sense and ‘no’ in another. We find this 
view plausible if the ranking of certain virtues over others (whether 
 universally or only in certain circumstances) is explained further, e.g., 
by the fact that one action (which displays certain virtues) maximizes 
utility, or accords with some deontological principle, or more generally 
increases the value of the world to a greater extent than any other action 
that is available to the agent. However, the problem with accepting any 
such further explanation for the ranking of certain virtues over others 
pushes the VNET in question back onto the first horn of our dilemma.
Alternatively, the VNET proponent could maintain that there are no 
further explanations for the ranking of certain virtues over others 
(whether in all or only some circumstances). But then it remains utterly 
mysterious as to why  certain virtues outrank others. The arbitrariness of 
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such ranking facts seems to bleed into the entire moral system if these 
facts truly are thought to be the fundamental, rock-bottom explanations 
for an action’s deontic status.
4. Conclusion
We have argued that a normative ethical theory, with the traditional aim 
of identifying the criteria of rightness is complete to the degree to which 
it satisfies two conditions: (A) taking a stance on the deontic status of 
anything that can have a deontic status in any possible circumstance, 
and (B) identifying the maximal set of fundamental right-making 
 features (if the theory in question thinks anything has a deontic status). 
We argued that more work needs to be done in order for existing VNETs 
to satisfy (A), at least to the degree to which other typical normative 
eth ic al views satisfy (A). Until this is done, such VNETs will remain 
consistent with a range of particular versions of consequentialism, 
deontology, and contractualism. Some proponents of VNETs will not 
like this conclusion, as many vehemently reject existing forms of conse-
quentialism, deontology, and contractualism. They may even be right to 
do so. However, whether one personally rejects these normative ethical 
views is a distinct question from whether the particular positive view 
they defend, as it’s formulated in print, is a competitor to such views.
Second, we argued that satisfying condition (B) poses a dilemma for 
each VNET. Either it will fail to be a distinctively virtue ethical position 
or it will be committed to an implausible or mysterious set of funda-
mental right-making features. If our arguments are successful, there is 
good reason to be skeptical of the possibility of developing a viable 
account of virtue ethics that fulfills the same role as its supposed norma-
tive ethical rivals.34
34 For very helpful written and verbal feedback we are very grateful to Sean Aas, Ben 
Bradley, Brad Cokelet, Neil Feit, Camil Golub, David Hershenov, Jens Johansson, Frances 
Kamm, Steve Kershnar, Pauline Kleingeld, Robert Louden, Robert MacDougall, Collin O’Neil, 
Doug Portmore, Philip Reed, Julie Tannenbaum, Mark Timmons, Denise Vigani, the 
 an onym ous referees who read this article, and the audience at the Tucson Workshop in 
Normative Ethics.
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